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KOOTENAI TRIBE OF 1DAHO v. VENEMAN:
THE ROADLESS RULE: DEAD END
OR NEVER ENDING ROAD?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Today, we launch one of the largest preservation efforts in
America's history to protect these priceless, back-country lands."'
In 1999, President William Clinton directed the United States For-
est Service to promulgate a rule with the intent to conserve and
protect inventoried and uninventoried roadless forest land.2 This
directive, termed the Roadless Rule (Rule), purported to protect
between forty and sixty million acres of National Forest land. 3 Due
to the halt in road construction, reconstruction and a decrease of
timber harvesting associated with the Rule, concerned parties filed
suit to enjoin the Rule. 4
The District Court of Idaho, in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Vene-
man,5 became one of the first courts to examine the Rule's compli-
ance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
regulations. 6 The court included the Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) requirement and the ripeness doctrine in its analysis of
NEPA. 7 The EIS requirement lies at the heart of NEPA's procedu-
1. Allison S. Hoyt, Comment, Roadless Area Conservation: How the "Roadless
Rule" Affects America's Forestland, 14 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 525, 525-26 (2001) (quoting
President Clinton's announcement of Roadless Rule initiative in 1999).
2. See id. at 526 (discussing President Clinton's announcement and resulting
Roadless Rule). The Roadless Rule [hereinafter Rule] was published in the Fed-
eral Register on January 12, 2001. See id.
3. See id. at 525 n.1 (discussing components of Rule).
4. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1231 (D.
Idaho 2001) (addressing and ruling on compliance of Rule with statutory stan-
dards). The variety of parties involved in the suit include: the Kootenai Tribe of
Idaho, Boise County of Idaho, various Boards of Commissioners in Idaho, Snow-
mobile Associations and Clubs, Livestock groups and Ann Veneman, the then Sec-
retary of Agriculture. See id.
5. See id. (discussing claims regarding compliance of Rule with various agency
standards and requirements).
6. See id. (deciding on injunction sought against Roadless Rule). The District
Court of Idaho was not the only court dealing with the validity of the Rule; six
other districts, in seven states, faced similar suits. See 66 Fed. Reg. 44,111, 44112
(Aug. 22, 2001). The District Court of Idaho, however, was the first court to rule
on the issue. See Kootenai, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
7. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-42 (requiring Environmental Impact
Statement [hereinafter EIS] for extra Rule and holding that issue was ripe for
judicial review).
(151)
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ral regulations and has been the source of increased litigation at-
tempting to define the specific terms of the requirement. 8 The
court analyzed the ripeness doctrine to determine if judicial juris-
diction had been established. 9
This Note explores the Idaho District Court's decision and in-
terpretation of both NEPA requirements and the ripeness doctrine
in the context of President Clinton's directive and resulting Rule.' 0
Section II summarizes the factual context of Kootenai.I Section III
provides a background of the Rule, NEPA requirements and the
ripeness doctrine. 12 Section IV discusses the district court's holding
in the case and provides a critical analysis of its consistency with
established case law."' Finally, Section V examines the impact of
the district court's decision on future jurisprudence and its poten-
tial repercussions upon the Rule's environmental goals. 14
II. FACTS
In 1999, President Clinton directed the Forest Service to devise
a regulation to prevent further construction of roads in the forest
system. 15 The goal of the Rule was to protect inventoried as well as
uninventoried roadless areas.' 6 Thereafter, the Forest Service is-
sued a Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS in order to begin the
8. See Michael E. Lackey, Jr., Misdirecting NEPA: Leaving the Definition of Reason-
able Alternatives in the EIS to the Applicants, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1235 n.22
(1992) (citing cases examining issue of EIS requirement).
9. See Eacata Desiree Gregory, Comment, No Time is the Right Time: The Supreme
Court's Use of Ripeness to Block Judicial Review of Forest Plans for Environmental Plaintiffs
in Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 75 Cui.-KNT L. REV. 613, 614 (2000) (discuss-
ing background and importance of ripeness doctrine as tool to determine judicial
review).
10. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1239-42 (using EIS requirement and
ripeness as decisional criteria regarding Rule).
11. For a discussion of the facts of Kootenai, see infra notes 15-30 and accom-
panying text.
12. For a discussion of National Environmental Protection Act [hereinafter
NEPA] requirements and the ripeness doctrine, see infra notes 65-93 and accom-
panying text.
13. For narrative and critical analyses of Kootenai, see infra notes 94-184 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the impact of Kootenai on other jurisdictions, see infra
notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
15. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (explaining background and history
of Rule).
16. See id. The term "inventoried" stems from the Forest Service's second at-
tempt to programmatically study the roadless areas in RARE II. California v.
Block, 690 F.2d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 1982). For a more detailed discussion of RARE
11, see infra notes 37 - 44 and accompanying text.
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necessary public comment period.' 7 The State of Idaho filed suit in
December 1999, arguing that the Forest Service did not sufficiently
comply with the public comment provisions of NEPA.' 8 While the
court dismissed Idaho's action as premature, the Forest Service con-
tinued to work on the Rule, releasing a draft EIS with the proposed
rule in May 2000.19 On January 5, 2001, the Forest Service com-
pleted an EIS and released the Final Rule, scheduled to be imple-
mented in May 2001.20
The Kootenai Tribe of Idaho and interest groups concerned
about commercial and recreational use of forest areas brought suit
against Ann Veneman, the Secretary of Agriculture, and other gov-
ernment officials. 2' The suit contested the adoption and validity of
the Rule promulgated by the Forest Service under President Clin-
ton's direction. 22 On January 8, 2001, the Kootenai Tribe and ad-
joining parties sought an injunction and withdrawal of the Rule for
violations of several environmental acts in the District of Idaho.23
On January 20, 2001, prior to the court's decision, then recently
elected President George W. Bush ordered the Rule's postpone-
ment for sixty days, redirecting the Rule's effective date to May 12,
2001.24
17. See id. (explaining that Forest Service allowed public comment filing for
sixty day period and rejected requests for extension of this period).
18. Id. (noting grant of Forest Service's request for Motion to Dismiss). The
court in this hearing stated that there was no "final agency action" on this matter
to date. See id. Therefore, the challenge was not ripe for judicial review. See id.
The court continued by pointing out that it was unable to find caselaw supporting
review of an agency action during the comment scoping period and this is why the
motion to dismiss had to be granted. See id.
19. See id. (noting Forest Service allowed sixty-nine day comment period re-
garding draft EIS and proposed rule while again denying time extension requests).
20. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235-36 (distinguishing draft from final
EIS). The final EIS differed in its expansion of regulated areas not included in the
draft version as well as applying the Rule immediately to the Tongass National
Forest, which was given a five-year review plan under the draft EIS. See id. The
final EIS applied the Rule to all inventoried roadless areas, prohibited road con-
struction, reconstruction, and timber harvesting making exceptions for steward-
ship. See id. The final EIS also removed the procedural rule analysis by placing it
in the final Forest Planning Regulations. See id. Further, the final EIS also in-
creased the total land encompassed by the Rule from 54.3 million acres stated in
the draft version to 58.5 million. See id.
21. See id. at 1231 (noting different parties involved in suit).
22. See id. at 1235 (stating rule intended to preserve roadless areas in national
forest).
23. See id. at 1236 (recognizing that plaintiffs' claims lie on violations of Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, NEPA, National Forest Management Act [hereinafter
NFMA], Organic Administration Act, Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, Section
108, Wilderness Act, and National Historic Preservation Act).
24. See id. at 1236 (explaining President Bush postponed all of Clinton's last
minute regulations and rules not yet implemented).
20031
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The District Court of Idaho in Kootenai addressed and made
findings on issues necessary for a final ruling. 25 The district court
held that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims after analyz-
ing issues of standing, requirement of the EIS and ripeness of the
claim.2 6 More specifically, the district court found that the plain-
tiffs had standing in the case; it was likely they suffered irreparable
injury; the Forest Service did not adequately follow procedural
guidelines in preparing an EIS; and the plaintiffs would likely suc-
ceed on the merits of their claims. 27
Despite its findings, the district court recognized that the dis-
cussion of irreparable injury was slightly premature in light of Presi-
dent Bush's postponement of implementation of the Rule. 28 The
district court then withheld ruling on the injunction sought by the
plaintiffs until the government issued its expected status report.29
After receiving the status report, the district court granted the
plaintiffs' request for an injunction, thereby preventing the Forest
Service's implementation of the Rule scheduled for May 2001.
30
III. BACKGROUND
A. Roadless Directive
In October 1999, President Clinton announced an initiative to
develop a forest management plan to ban construction and recon-
struction of roadless areas within the National Forest System. 31
Subsequently termed the Roadless Rule, it is considered "the most
25. See Kootenai, F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (granting injunction until governmental
status report in May 2001). The district court based its finding on issues such as
standing, procedural requirements, and ripeness. See id.
26. See id. at 1237-48 (examining all issues necessary in formulating judgment
on preliminary injunction: standing, ripeness, and irreparable injury).
27. See id. (summarizing district court's holding and findings throughout
case).
28. See id. at 1248 (stating government status report of ongoing review by new
administration would allow district court to review issue of injury).
29. See id. (ordering reversal of ruling on plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction pending issuance of government's status report).
30. See Kootenai v. Veneman, 2001 WL 1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001)
[hereinafter Kootenai 1] (holding all aspects of Rule as published in Federal Regis-
ter under 66 Fed. Reg. 3244 as well as 65 Fed. Reg. 67, 514 shall be enjoined from
implementation). The district court also ordered a Litigation Plan to be submitted
by June 11, 2001 in order to hold a telephone scheduling conference on June 21,
2001 to confirm deadlines proposed by the parties and to set the matter for trial.
Id.
31. See Jennifer L. Sullivan, The Sprit of 76: Does President Clinton's Roadless
Lands Directive Violate the Spirit of the National Forest Management Act of 1976?, 17
ALAsKA L. REV. 127, 128 (2000) (discussing Rule's directive and its impact in forest
management).
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significant land preservation undertaking since Teddy Roosevelt
built the national forest system." 32 Shifts in public concern, evi-
denced by opinion and demand over the protection of resources
located in the Forest System prompted the creation of the Rule. 33
A further motivating factor stemmed from worry over the economic
impact of the significant backlog of existing construction within the
forests.34 Ultimately, the desire to preserve important social and
ecological resources in forest areas at risk of destruction from wa-
tershed damage and road construction led to the Rule's proposal.3 5
During his final months in office, President Clinton directed the
Forest Service to use these goals to create a proposal of long-term
environmental conservation of forest areas that fit under invento-
ried and later uninventoried areas recorded through past land
reviews.36
1. RARE I & RARE II
The first Roadless Area Review Evaluation (RARE I), sparked
in the 1960s, attempted to record and evaluate national forest
lands, especially areas dubbed "primitive. '3 7 Critics viewed RARE I
as a failure because it missed many areas for designation, did not
value areas in terms of ecological importance, did not recognize
areas planned for timber sales and only recommended a small area
for further study.38 RARE I was quickly abandoned due to ensuing
litigation concerning its inadequacies, and later, in 1977, a new
32. Id. at 128 (quoting President of Wilderness Society, William H. Meadows).
33. See id. at 138 (stating reasons given for proposal of Rule).
34. See id. (commenting road maintenance and reconstruction accounted for
over $8.4 billion in backlog).
35. See Hoyt, supra note 1, at 528 (discussing goals and purposes behind Presi-
dent Clinton's Roadless Rule).
36. See id. at 527-29 (setting forth background of Rule and previous attempts
at environmental protection of roadless areas).
37. See Susan Jane M. Brown, Comment, "Green Gold:" Securing Protection for
Roadless Areas on the Gifford Pinchot National Forest, 8 U. BALT. J. ENVrL. L. 1, 7-9
(2000) (stating Roadless Area Review Evaluation I [hereinafter RARE I] intended
to inventory more "primitive" lands being excluded from Wilderness Act of 1964
and was to be completed within one year). Rare I set out to inventory roadless
areas of at least 5,000 acres and adjacent existing wilderness areas. See id. In addi-
tion, RARE I intended to increase the Forest Service's knowledge in areas where it
had insufficient prior knowledge. See id.
38. See id. at 8-9 (discussing that due to its rushed nature RARE I was consid-
ered failure). Many analysts claim that the pressure placed upon the completion
of RARE I caused an inadequate, rushed evaluation. See id. In 1977, the Forest
Service fully abandoned RARE I and immediately began work on the second
Roadless Area Review Evaluation rhereinafter RARE II]. See id. at 9.
20031
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evaluation plan was promulgated, known as the second Roadless
Area Review Evaluation (RARE II).39
While RARE II incorporated all the areas recorded by RARE I,
it allowed time to complete a more thorough inventory of roadless
areas.40 RARE II established categories for the designation of land
and expanded the amount of land included in the inventory to over
sixty-two million acres, an increase from RARE I's fifty-six million
acres. 41 Facing similar litigation as its predecessor, the government
eventually abandoned RARE II for failing to comply with environ-
mental regulations. 42 Contrary to President Clinton's intent, critics
feared that his directive would only result in a third Roadless Area
Review Evaluation (RARE III) process.43 The Rule rather, ex-
pressed Clinton's goals concerning the inventoried lands brought
forth through the RARE projects. 44
2. Evolution and Purpose of the Roadless Rule
Understanding the background leading up to President Clin-
ton's proposal of the Rule is useful in examining the Rule itself and
its purpose. The Rule sought to protect benefits derived from
roadless areas in national forests.45 These benefits included: high
air, water and soil quality, protection of clean drinking water, undis-
turbed expanses and other values such as recreation. 46 Roadless
areas play a significant role because they protect various species
from disturbance while maintaining interior habitats from activities
such as logging. 47
Maintaining roadless land prevents exploitation by the timber
industry, which often receives blame for the negative effects of log-
39. See id. (stating RARE II was designed to learn from RARE I and be more
effective inventory tool).
40. See id. (commenting RARE II was to be in effect from 1977 through 1979).
41. See Brown, supra note 37 at 8-9 (providing that categories of RARE II in-
cluded recommended wilderness, multiple use, and further study).
42. See id. at 10 (concluding RARE II was scrapped after court decisions result-
ing in injunctions on evaluation). The third Roadless Area Review Evaluation
[hereinafter RARE 11I] was expected to commence in the future; however, Con-
gress thereafter passed various legislation protecting lands found under RARE I
and II. See id..
43. See id. at 12.
44. See id. (stating goal of Rule was not to inventory roadless areas, rather to,
"restrict certain activities such as road construction and reconstruction in invento-
ried roadless areas.").
45. See Hoyt, supra note 1 at 528-29 (discussing social and ecological benefits
provided by protection of roadless areas through Rule).
46. See id. (enumerating benefits found in forest roadless areas).
47. See Brown, supra note 37, at 5 (explaining roadless areas are "training
grounds" for future wilderness in that wilderness is land that is roadless).
6
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ging on the overall health of forests. 48 For example, timber pro-
duction can lead to poorly maintained existing roads, resulting in
degradation of forestland by flooding, landslides, stream sedimen-
tation and reduction in species' productivity. 49 The Rule sought to
combat these hazards by promoting the overall health and stability
of the forest systems. - 1
In order to prevent future degradation and to reverse current
degradation, the Rule contained a number of protections for
roadless areas.5 1 The Rule called for protection of over fifty-eight
million acres of forestland- accounting for approximately thirty-one
percent of all National Forest Service lands.52 Two significant as-
pects of the Rule included: (1) prohibition of road construction
and reconstruction in protected areas, and (2) prohibition of tim-
ber removal. 53 Though not open-ended, the Rule provided for pre-
vention mechanisms of road construction and reconstruction. 54 In
actuality, the Rule provided some exceptions, including: (1) con-
struction that will prevent or limit a "catastrophic event," (2) re-
sponsibility for CERCLA reaction, (3) exercising of rights statutorily
granted, (4) realignment of existing, essential roads, (5) recon-
struction of hazardous existing roads, and (6) roads included in a
Federal Aid Highway Project.55 The Rule provided similar excep-
48. See Sullivan, supra note 37, at 139 (discussing hazards of road building for
timber industry).
49. See id. (mentioning additional environmental harms linked to road build-
ing in forests such as, "fragmentation and degradation of habitat for some wildlife
species."). Human impact may result in environmental hazards due to increased
human visits to areas traditionally limited in access. See id.
50. See id. (explaining that although roads are important for timber industry
and human enjoyment, they lead to decreased health of forests).
51. See Final Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 294.12 (2000) (presenting codified version of
Rule).
52. See Hoyt, supra note 1, at 529 (forwarding that Rule protects fifty-eight and
one-half million acres of forest, thirty-one percent of National Forest Service land
and about two percent of land of United States). The Forest Service states that its
lands include about 386,000 miles of roads and that the Rule deals with three
categories of protection: (1) prohibition of construction and reconstruction, (2)
prohibition of timber removal on protected lands, and (3) application to the Ton-
gass National Forest in Alaska. See id.
53. See id. For a discussion of the denial of an extension of time, see supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
54. See Final Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 294.12 (2000) (presenting codified version of
Rule).
55. See Hoyt, supra note 1, at 530 (discussing Rule's general prohibition of
road construction or reconstruction). Included in the exceptions to the Rule's
prohibition is the allowance of road construction or reconstruction "'in conjunc-
tion with the continuation, extension, or renewal of a mineral lease on lands that
are under lease or for new leases issued immediately upon expiration of an ex-
isting lease.'" Id.
2003]
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tions for prohibited activities termed "timber harvesting." 56 Al-
though exceptions to the Rule are limited, they illustrate its
inherent flexibility.57
The National Forest Service prepared President Clinton's pro-
posed Rule as a regulation to achieve these specified goals.58 In
October 1999, the Forest Service issued a Notice of Intent to pre-
pare an EIS that provided scoping comments within a sixty-day pe-
riod.59 In May 2000, the Forest Service released a draft EIS and a
proposed version of the Rule.60 In early November 2000, the Forest
Service published a final EIS and byJanuary 2001, released the final
Rule with a Record of Decision to implement the Rule by May 12,
2001.61
3. New Administrative Action to Roadless Rule
With the Rule's implementation scheduled for May 2001, re-
cently elected President George W. Bush ordered the Rule's post-
ponement. 62 President Bush exhibited some apprehension toward
the Rule, leaving its future uncertain. 63 In light of postponement,
56. See id. (explaining exceptions to timber removal prohibition). The Rule
allows for exceptions such as timber harvesting that: improves endangered or
threatened species' habitat, avoids forest disaster by "maintaining ecosystem com-
position," relates to management activity not prohibited by the Rule, serves admin-
istrative or personal use, occurs post-inventory but prior to the Rule in areas so
drastically altered that they no longer comport with the definition of a roadless
area. See id.
57. See id. at 530-31 (discussing exceptions and requirement that harvesting
comply with exception analysis under § 294.13(b) (1) of Rule).
58. See Kootenai 'ibe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (provid-
ing factual background of Rule and Clinton's directive). Clinton directed the For-
est Service to develop and prepare for public comment a plan to protect roadless
areas by ending construction and reconstruction of roads and also to protect in-
ventoried as well as uninventoried areas across forest system. Id.
59. See id. (explaining requirement of filing with Forest Service and that sixty
day period was not extended despite requests from different parties).
60. See id. at 1235-36 (stating draft EIS was 700 pages and sixty-nine day com-
ment period followed release of draft EIS and Rule proposal).
61. See id. at 1236 (discussing that final Rule expanded regulated areas from
draft EIS and encompassed several other changes from draft version).
62. See Idaho v. United States Forest Service, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1253 (D.
Idaho 2001) (discussing present administrative action on Rule and sixty-day post-
ponement of effective date).
63. See Hoyt, supra note 1 at 546 (discussing current standing of Rule and
possible future action). It is acknowledged that although President Bush disfavors
the Rule, to defeat it would require the Bush Administration to repeat the same
efforts taken to enact the Rule. See id. Therefore, the Bush Administration will be
forced to closely examine the Rule and consider gains of timber industry in light of
the Rule's environmental protections. See id. at 547.
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the government has decided to review the Rule and provide peri-
odic status reports. 6 4
B. National Environmental Policy Act
Funneled through the Forest Service, the Rule was controlled
by regulatory standards purported under NEPA. 65 NEPA's enact-
ment arose during a movement to leave traditional common law for
a more publicly concentrated law focused on growing concerns of
environmental protection. 66 NEPA aimed to create "a comprehen-
sive national policy for the environment modeled around ideals of
sustainability and ecosystem balance" and to ensure agency compli-
ance with environmental policy through the introduction of the
EIS.
6 7
NEPA requires federal agencies engaging in "major federal ac-
tions that significantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment" to prepare an EIS for public review, participation and
comment.68 A critical question concerning NEPA arises in the con-
text of what actions trigger the EIS requirement. 69 Some courts
view the requirement as precipitated by affirmative environmental
alteration, while other courts hold that the EIS requirement is not
automatically triggered by actions that do not alter the environ-
ment.70 An EIS must examine potential environmental impacts of a
proposed action and possible alternatives. 7' The EIS process invites
64. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248 (delaying court's decision until re-
ceipt of governmental status report regarding review of Rule in light of Bush's
postponement).
65. See MatthewJ. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose: The Withering Away of
the National Environmental Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 245, 245 (2000) (discussing purpose of NEPA and its application to fed-
eral agencies in considering environmental impacts of their policies).
66. See id. at 245 (examining passage of NEPA and its importance in repre-
senting new time for "environmental governance").
67. See id. at 246 (exploring three accomplishments of passage of NEPA).
68. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir.
1992) (relying on authority of 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (g)(1) (1994)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (1994) (establishing policies and goals of NEPA).
69. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1497-98 (9th Cir.
1995) (describing EIS requirements); see also Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against
Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772-73 (1983) (indicating physical environment
must be protected). For a futher discussion of what actions trigger the EIS re-
quirement, see notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
70. For a further discussion of actions that trigger the EIS requirement, see
infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
71. See Matthew Porterfield, Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representa-
tive: The (Con)Fusion of APA Standing and the Merits Under NEPA, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 157, 165 (1995) (introducing purpose and requirements of EIS). The pur-
pose of an EIS is to ensure that the public knows of governmental actions that may
2003]
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public participation that enables affected parties to participate in
governmental decision-making that may have an environmental im-
pact on the community. 72 The EIS must also be made available for
public comment and circulation.73 Two main purposes are served
by an EIS: (1) to take an adequate look at every reasonable alterna-
tive and provide enough detail to provide a "thorough discussion of
significant aspects of probable environmental consequences;" and
(2) to be prepared with actions that commit resources to affirma-
tive human development of the environment, change existing envi-
ronmental conditions or alter the environmental status quo.7 4
Triggering the EIS requirement requires particular examina-
tion of the type of action taken.75 The Supreme Court, in Metropoli-
tan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy (Metro),73 clarified that
NEPA regulations were only for assessment of future actions "where
an agency... significantly affects the quality of the human environ-
ment. ' 77 The Metro Court stated that the resulting environmental
impact must be evaluated along with any adverse environmental ef-
fects of an agency proposal. 78 According to the Metro Court, the key
to the EIS requirement rests in the relationship between the envi-
have an environmental impact and that decisions are not made without regard to
any significant environmental impacts. See id. at 166. Once an EIS is completed,
an agency can continue with the proposed plan unless through the EIS process, an
alternative is identified as posing less of a negative environmental impact. See id.
The EIS process is not intended to eliminate environmental harm, rather it is
meant to address possible negative environmental consequences of an action in
hopes of making more environmentally conscious decisions. See id. at 166-67.
72. See Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental
Justice, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 565, 571 (1997) (discussing how NEPA sparks environ-
mental justice by inviting public participation which empowers communication
that may educate government regarding environmental effects of its decisions).
73. See Mass. v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Grazing Fields
Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1073-74 (lst Cir. 1980)); see also Citizens for a
Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing
need for EIS to look at every reasonable alternative rather than every possible
alternative).
74. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1239-40 (D. Idaho
2001) (quoting test under Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995)).
75. See generally, Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995); see gener-
ally Metro, 460 U.S. 766 (1983). For a further discussion of actions triggering EIS
requirement see infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
76. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
77. See Metro, 460 U.S. at 771, 772 (paraphrasing statutory language of NEPA
in light of specific facts present in Metro case and discussing that NEPA require-
ments are triggered when there is close relationship between environmental
change and effect at issue).
78. See id. (concluding NEPA does not require agency to look at every impact
or effect of given proposal, just impact or effect on environment).
10
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ronmental effect and the change of any major federal action.7 9
The Court noted that if such a relationship were too attenuated, it
would not require an EIS, and therefore, a direct effect needs to be
realized rather than a present "risk" of effect.8 0 The Metro Court
warned of using NEPA requirements as a policy tool and clarified
that its purpose was to protect against future environmental harms
as opposed to past harms or those with a potential environmental
impact.8
Douglas County v. Babbitt8 2 established that NEPA covers federal
actions that alter the natural physical environment.8 3 In Babbitt, the
Ninth Circuit clarified the purpose of NEPA as "provid[ing] a
mechanism to enhance or improve the environment and prevent
further irreparable damage. '84 While there may be disagreement
as to the triggering of the EIS requirement under NEPA, both the
Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have held that
EIS requirements are not prompted if a federal action does not al-
ter the physical environment.
85
C. Ripeness
Ripeness is a procedural question regarding parties and the
claims they bring before a court that aids in determining subject
matter jurisdiction.8 6 If a court considers a claim to be unripe for
review, then that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the
complaint will be dismissed.8 7 The purpose of the ripeness doc-
79. See id. at 773 (determining EIS requirement is triggered with considera-
tion of relationship existing between effect and given change on physical environ-
ment of federal action).
80. See id. at 775 (recognizing burden on federal agency to create EIS for
action that has effects too remote to be realized).
81. See id. at 777-79 (concluding NEPA should not be forum to mesh out pol-
icy disagreements or to remedy past accidents).
82. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
83. Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d at 1505 (stating court holding that NEPA
does not require EIS for actions that preserve physical environment).
84. Id. (quoting Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981)).
The Babbit court continued that an EIS reporting on the "environmental impact"
of federal actions is mandated by NEPA under the statute. See id. The Babbitt court
also cited to Metro's holding, supporting that NEPA does not require an EIS for
every action. See id. The court's support of Metro lends proof that reliance on the
physical environment allows the court to hold that the EIS requirement is not
triggered by actions that preserve the physical environment. See id.
85. For further discussion of the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court holdings
regarding the triggering of the EIS requirement, see supra notes 75-85 and accom-
panying text.
86. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1242 (D. Idaho
2001) (introducing court's review of ripeness in this case).
87. See id. (laying out foundational basis of ripeness doctrine).
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trine is to prevent judicial intervention in abstract disagreements
regarding administrative matters by preventing premature court re-
view.88 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a regula-
tion is not typically considered to be ripe for review until "its factual
components have been fleshed out by some concrete action apply-
ing the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that
harms or threatens to harm them."89
The traditional ripeness test evaluates whether the issue is fit
for judicial review and if extreme hardship to the parties will result
by a delay in court consideration.90 Failure to comply with any of
NEPA's procedural requirements allows for immediate injury to sat-
isfy traditional ripeness tests.91 The ripeness doctrine is often used
as a tool to preclude judicial review of agency actions confusing
with standing analysis.9 2 Finally, some court decisions have facially
inferred ripeness into NEPA claims.93
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Kootenai, the District Court of Idaho began its examination
of the Rule by outlining the factual and procedural background of
the case.94 Throughout the background, the court concentrated
on the Rule's implementation timeline, the EIS processes, and the
foundations for litigation. 95 Further, the court recognized that the
88. See Amanda C. Cohen, Ripeness Revisited: The Implications of Ohio Forestry
Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club for Environmental Litigation, 23 HARV. ENvrVL. L.
REV. 547, 550 (1999) (discussing proposition of ripeness rule and safeguards).
89. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990)(examin-
ing ripeness in regard to EIS requirement).
90. Cohen, supra note 88, at 550 (quoting Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra
Club, 523 U.S. 726, 738 (1998), which likens ripeness test to that of standing under
Constitution). Under the United States Constitution, Article III, § 2, cl. 1, the ripe-
ness inquiry balances the party's interests with the judiciary's interest. See id.
91. See id. at 560 (citing Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 and Lujan, 497 U.S. at
882). The Lujan Court maintains that immediate injury can be shown solely by
failure to comply with NEPA requirements. See id.
92. See Gregory, supra note 9, at 615 (describing ripeness beginning as 'judi-
cially created prudential concern" to block review).
93. See id. at 637 (stating that ripeness may be differentiated between proce-
dural and substantive matters as suggested by Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737).
94. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (D. Idaho
2001) (discussing progression of Rule from Clinton's 1999 directive to present
action).
95. See id. at 1235-36. The court discussed the Forest Service's release of EIS
(draft and final versions) and the manner in which the Forest Service solicited
public comment. See id. Due to the timeliness of the Rule, the Forest Service did
not grant increases in the public comment period, instead allowing sixty days after
the publication of the Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact State-
ment and another sixty-nine days after the draft EIS. See id.
12
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Rule's final EIS expanded areas of forest land originally within the
Rule. 9 6 The court ended its background discussion with an outline
of the litigation and the plaintiffs' claims.97
A. Standard of Review
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) controlled litigation
because the Forest Service governed the Rule.98 The court applied
the appropriate standard of review by balancing the plaintiffs' likeli-
hood of success against the relative hardship to the parties. 99
The primary concern of the court focused on whether it had
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims. 100 In particular, the court
addressed three questions regarding jurisdictional issues: (1)
whether the court had jurisdiction because the Rule requires an
EIS; (2) whether subject matter jurisdiction was supported by a con-
crete injury to the Plaintiffs; and (3) whether the court had an obli-
gation to raise a ripeness argument sua sponte, if not first raised by
the parties. 101
B. Jurisdictional Claims
In beginning a jurisdictional examination, the court must es-
tablish that the plaintiffs have standing for the claim. 10 2 In deter-
mining the plaintiffs' standing, the court restated some commonly
held constitutional requirements: finding injury in fact, traceability
96. See id. (examining differences between Rule and draft EIS including
broadening scope of Rule to include all inventoried roadless areas, not just un-
roaded areas included in draft EIS adding over four million acres to covered area).
97. See id. at 1236 (explaining plaintiffs' actions resting on claimed violations
of Administrative Procedure Act, NEPA, NFMA and other acts with sought remedy
being preliminary injunction).
98. See id. (reiterating that Administrative Procedure Act control was founded
under premise of limited judicial review of agency action to assure that action is
not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."). The court also pointed out that under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act there is a presumption that agencies act in accordance with the law. See
id.
99. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (citing Walczak v. EPL Prolong, Inc.,
198 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999)). The specific standard relies on a plaintiffs
demonstration of either a combination of success on the merits of the claim and
possibility of irreparable injury or a showing of serious questions raised with a bal-
ancing of hardships in favor of the plaintiff. See id. (citing Idaho Sporting Cong. v.
Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2000)).
100. See id. at 1237 (discussing issues ofjurisdiction to ensure proper judicial
review).
101. See id. (recognizing that jurisdiction of court over claims arose as thresh-
old matter).
102. See id. (determining jurisdiction where party must have standing to be
appropriately before court).
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of the injury to the challenged action and the redressability of the
injury with a favorable decision. 0 3 It identified case law granting
plaintiffs standing based on an injury resulting from violations of
procedural requirements of acts such as NEPA.' 0 4 In regard to
finding an injury in fact, the court set forth a requirement that the
plaintiffs must show procedural violations to be immediate rather
than speculative and that those individual members, rather than a
collective group, felt the injury. 05 In this case, the court found that
the Kootenai Tribe (Tribe) sufficiently demonstrated a personal-
ized, geographical nexus demonstrated such that they would suffer
from environmental impacts imposed on the area by the Rule. 10 6
The Tribe illustrated that declined forest management under the
Rule would harm their interest in the area for recreational, aes-
thetic, spiritual and other uses. 117 The court also found that the
plaintiffs illustrated that injuries such as wildfires and disease out-
breaks would result from management planning changes and
would not occur but-for the Forest Service's rapid implementation
of the Rule. 08 Based on these findings, the court determined that
the plaintiffs had met the injury threshold for standing.10 9
Through an analysis of the traceability and redressability of the
plaintiffs' claim, the court found that the Tribe had satisfied the
requirements, and thus had standing under Article III of the Con-
103. See id. at 1238 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv.,
528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)). The Court stated that in addition to the constitu-
tional requirements of standing, the plaintiff must show that the injury alleged is
within the "zone of interests" of the protections of NEPA. See Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495,
1499 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (recognizing Idaho Conservation
League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1508 (9th Cir. 1992), where Ninth Circuit held
this harm to be recognized by Congress and distinct in nature rather than conjec-
tural or hypothetical).
105. See id. at 1238-39 (discussing previous court holdings requiring individu-
alized injury in connection with challenged action).
106. See id. at 1239 (finding concrete interest of Kootenai Tribe in recrea-
tional, aesthetic, spiritual and other uses of roadless areas). The resulting environ-
mental harm from the Rule would cause a decrease in active forest management,
thus showing a personalized link to affected areas. See id.
107. See id. (stating that local regulation of areas to protect environmental
features would reduce harm to tribal members and other parties such as livestock
companies).
108. See id. at 1239 (stating fact that injury may not occur is irrelevant and that
fact of possible overlooking of such injuries or ignoring reasonable alternatives
through inadequate following of rules under NEPA is sufficient for traceability and
redress of injury).
109. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (holding plaintiffs' conferred
standing).
14
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stitution." 0 The court found direct causation between the rapid
implementation of the Rule and the alleged injury."' Causation,
along with the type of alleged injury would not occur if the Rule was
not implemented, thus, the court concluded that the parties would
be redressed by an injunction halting a change in forest
management. " 12
C. EIS Requirement
The court subsequently examined the argument surrounding
the EIS requirement of the Roadless Rule. 113 The defendants
claimed that the Rule did not require the preparation of an EIS
because the Rule did not "commit resources to some affirmative
human development of the environment, did not change existing
environmental conditions, and did not alter the environmental sta-
tus quo."114 NEPA mandates that federal government agencies
comply with EIS requirements to the "fullest extent possible" when
they take actions that will significantly affect the human environ-
mental quality." 5 The court rejected the Forest Service's argument
that NEPA's EIS requirement did not apply because the Rule left
forest land untouched and there were no affirmative actions.' 16
The court instead recognized that removing decision-making from
forest plans that govern management of national forests was
enough of an affirmative action to require reliance on NEPA's EIS
110. See id. (holding that along with precedent from other Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, plaintiffs met their burden to confer standing by satisfying all three constitu-
tional prongs).
111. See id. (discussing that traceability can be established). The showing of
traceability requires that:
the alleged injury - wildfires, disease outbreaks, and insect infestation,
resulting from national changes in active local management plans prohib-
iting road construction, reconstruction and/or timber harvesting, pur-
portedly as result of statutory violations - would not have occurred but
for the decision of the Forest Service in pushing the implementation of
the Roadless Rule on a fast track.
Id.
112. See id. (holding possible non-occurrence of alleged injury irrelevant be-
cause real injury is that environmental consequences may be ignored or over-
looked through procedural failures).
113. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
114. Id. at 123940 (recognizing plaintiffs' asserted requirement of EIS may
hold under NFMA).
115. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (restating goals and expectations of
EIS requirement).
116. Id.
2003]
15
Meindl: Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman: The Roadless Rule: Dead End o
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
166 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X1V: p. 151
mandates.' 17 The court concluded the plaintiffs had jurisdiction
based on the merits of the case.' 8
D. Ripeness
The court next examined issues of ripeness raised sua
sponte." 9 Since the litigation had been instigated prior to the
commencement of the Rule, the court felt it necessary to address
the impact of this timing issue on the legitimacy of the plaintiffs'
claim.' 20 A primary concern of the court was the timing of a gov-
ernmental status report and the plaintiffs' request for injunctive re-
lief.12' In order to avoid a premature decision, the court wanted to
allow the government the opportunity to make changes that would
be accounted for when examining the Rule. 122 The court also fo-
cused on the previous publication of the Rule in the Federal Regis-
ter - illustrating its treatment as a complete process.'2 3 The court
in Kootenai found that waiting for a governmental position would be
an inadequate ripeness requirement. 24 The court, therefore,
found the plaintiffs' claim ripe for review. 125
E. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Further, the court addressed the claim's likelihood of success
on the merits. 126 Specifically, it examined the plaintiffs' procedural
117. See id. (holding prohibition of activities such as road construction alters
status quo by departing from established local forest plans). The court explained
that changing or limiting active forest management changes the status quo in
preventing enactment of land management that will impact the environment in a
manner that NEPA intended to protect. See id.
118. See id. at 1241 (setting forth holding regarding jurisdiction).
119. See id. at 1241-42.
120. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (stating Rule was to be implemented
on Jan. 5, 2001). President Bush's postponement scheduled the Rule to begin on
May 12, 2001 and there was supposed to be a government status report in early
May 2001. See id. The court discussed the possible impact of rtling on a prelimi-
nary injunction prior to the government report. See id. at 1242.
121. Id. (acknowledging pending governmental status report and discussing
its impact on reaching decision in this case).
122. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (recognizing importance of allowing
ample time for review by new Bush administration).
123. See id. (realizing that although government withdrew opinion regarding
Rule, publication in Federal Register shows that for exception of Bush's postpone-
ment, Rule would have been in effect).
124. See id. (stating publication of Rule in Federal Register and Record of
Decision shows that implementation of rule would be in effect if not for govern-
mental stay).
125. See id. (holding that finding issue not ripe for review is not adequate
remedy).
126. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 124243.
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challenges against the Forest Service. 127 The court began by ad-
dressing the range of alternatives available to the Forest Service. 128
Realizing that the requirement to investigate alternatives was the
crux of NEPA's EIS requirement, and failing to adequately do so
equated to an inappropriate EIS, the court addressed the Forest
Service's "hard look" at reasonable alternatives in creating the
Rule's EIS. 129
The court found that the Forest Service's alternatives to the
banned road construction and reconstruction areas differed only in
the level of restriction cast on timber harvesting. 130 The court rec-
ognized that alternatives outside the agency's objectives were not
required; however, the court reasoned that other alternatives were
available to the Forest Service that fell within the policy objectives
of reducing risk to inventoried roadless areas; thus, the plaintiffs
could pose a challenge to the alternatives addressed by the Forest
Service. 131
In light of the public comment period allowed under the Rule,
the court examined the Forest Service's compliance with NEPA re-
127. See id. at 1242-43 (discussing claims for procedural challenge resting in
NEPA). The court identified the Ninth Circuit's rule that looks at a challenge to
see if there is a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the
probable environmental consequences." Id. at 1242 (quoting Or. Envtl. Council v.
Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir. 1987)). The court furthered that this rea-
soning employs a reviewing court to adjudge whether an agency took a "hard look"
at the possible environmental consequences of their actions in compliance with
NEPA's informed decision-making and public participation goals. See id. at 1242-
43.
128. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (examining contention that failure
to address and seriously consider range of available alternatives was NEPA viola-
tion). The plaintiffs contend that the Forest Service did not consider a "broad
range of alternatives," thus pre-determining the outcome. See id.
129. See id. (quoting Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057
(9th Cir. 1985)). NEPA's standards for addressing whether an EIS is adequate
regarding proper analyzation of reasonable alternatives are "(1) whether the fed-
eral agency has sufficiently detailed information to make its decision in light of
potential environmental consequences and (2) whether the federal agency has
provided the public with information on the environmental impact of the pro-
posed action and encouraged public participation in the development of that in-
formation." Id.; see also Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1520
(9th Cir. 1992) (discussing Agency's responsibility to address all viable
alternatives).
130. See Kootenai,'142 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44 (finding Forest Service did con-
sider alternatives consistent with goals behind reasonable alternatives require-
ment). Also, noting that although alternatives inconsistent with the Rule do not
need to be examined, the Forest Service failed to address alternatives that were
consistent with prohibiting activities posing a great risk to "social and ecological
values of inventoried roadless areas." See id.
131. See id. at 1244 (reasoning that plaintiffs would succeed on merits of their
reasonable alternative violation of NEPA claim).
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quirements of public participation in the proposed Rule. 132 The
court forcefully concluded that the Forest Service's public com-
ment period was not adequate and denied the public a thorough
opportunity to participate in the process of formulating the
Roadless Rule.' 33 Supporting this finding, the court relied on the
confusing nature of the EIS provided by the Forest Service as well as
the denial of additional public comment time.13 4 Although recog-
nizing that the Forest Service complied with statutory minimums
under NEPA, the court chastised the Forest Service for the quality
of information provided during that minimum time frame. 135 The
court continued to emphasize full disclosure of information as nec-
essary for a complete, thorough and meaningful public input pe-
riod.136 The Forest Service's lack of straightforward, complete and
clear information strengthened the finding of a NEPA violation.1 37
F. Failure to Adequately Analyze Cumulative Impacts
The final aspect of the court's analysis regarding the Forest
Service's EIS production concerned the duty to discuss cumulative
impacts of an action.13 8 Discussing precedent, the court recognized
that an examination of impacts regarding an agency action is re-
quired and that in this case, the Forest Service failed to fully present
132. See id. at 1244 (addressing Forest Service's use of public comment and
whether it was sufficient and adequate under NEPA). NEPA requires that an
agency must "involve the public in preparing and implementing their NEPA proce-
dures" and this process invites participation from affected parties. Id. Public noti-
fication and an opportunity to comment on agency rulemaking is required and the
agency should consider comments in its decision-making. See id.
133. See id. at 1247 (commenting Forest Service's comment period deprived
public of meaningful participation, which violated NEPA).
134. See id. at 1244-45 (discussing public concern expressed over definitions
of certain terms utilized in Rule, such as "unroaded areas" and how this along with
inadequacy of information presented, staff conduct, meaningful consultation with
Indian Tribes and failure to grant additional comment time contributed to Forest
Service's failure to provide adequate comment period).
135. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1244-45 (concluding information pro-
vided by Forest Service was confusing in nature therefore inadequate for public
comment purposes).
136. See id. at 1246 (continuing time cannot be of essence regarding issue of
this magnitude and actions taken throughout this process suggest "pre-deter-
mined" political outcome).
137. See id. at 1246-47 (holding 700 page final Environmental Impact State-
ment generated 1.6 million comments, public meetings were held at end of com-
ment periods and many comments were not given response).
138. See id. at 1247 (formulating NEPA requirement to discuss cumulative im-
pacts in useful manner). The court recognized holdings where cursory discussions
and general remarks regarding impacts of an action were insufficient. See id.
18
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impacts in all areas presented in the EIS. 139 The court found the
Forest Service failed to adequately discuss cumulative impacts and
therefore violated NEPA. 140
Despite finding that the Forest Service violated NEPA in sev-
eral ways and that such violations allowed for a minimal showing by
the plaintiffs of harm, the court withheld ruling on the requested
injunction until the government presented a status report.1 4 1 On
May 4, 2001, however, the same court ordered the injunction after
the status report insufficiently dealt with EIS flaws and failed to ad-
dress identified problems. 142 The court, in granting the injunction,
stated that allowing the Rule to take effect would ignore the possi-
bility of repercussions.143
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. EIS Requirement Under NEPA
In Kootenai, the district court relied heavily on NEPA as the
primary procedural guideline to determine whether the Forest Ser-
vice adequately formulated the Rule. 144 The court attempted to en-
sure that the Forest Service complied with NEPA's procedures. 145
For example, the court substantially examined the requirement
that an agency prepare an EIS for agency actions that affect the
139. See id. (dismissing suggestion by Forest Service that non-predictable or
significant isolated aspects of EIS did not preclude discussion in broad scheme of
cumulative impacts in proposed and finalized Rule and accompanying policy).
140. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (holding likelihood of finding fail-
ure on behalf of Forest Service to fully discuss cumulative impacts of Rule).
141. See id. at 1248 (holding that although plaintiffs' claim has merit, legiti-
macy, and likelihood of success, court should postpone grant of injunction until
such time as new governmental administration has had opportunity to address
flaws of EIS and Rule).
142. See Kootenai I, 2001 WL 1141275, at *1-2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001) (grant-
ing injunction on appeal after governmental status report failed to achieve court's
desired results of Rule amendment and change).
143. See id. at *2 (stating Rule in current form and momentum would result in
years of litigation due to shear magnitude of Forest Service's action).
144. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (providing historical background
that Forest Service staff was authorized to formulate Rule in compliance with
NEPA standards).
145. See id. The district court, recognizing that other acts such as the NFMA
are implicated in this litigation, chose to concentrate on the Forest Services com-
pliance with NEPA standards. See id. The court further points out that the NFMA
requires the Forest Service to be in compliance with NEPA including the prepara-
tion of an EIS if necessary. See id. at 1240. Therefore, the EIS requirement stems
from NFMA's indirect mandate to comply with NEPA standards. See id.
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environment. 14 6 The court correctly retained the foundational test
under NEPA: that an agency must prepare an EIS in circumstances
of a "major federal action" that significantly affects the quality of
the human environment. 147 The court concentrated on the argu-
ment that the Forest Service must comply with the EIS standard
under NEPA.148 Thus, the court looked at actions under the Rule
to see if they would incite EIS compliance. 149 The court cited find-
ings that "leaving nature alone" does not absolve EIS compliance,
and that the Forest Service's Rule precluded enough state action to
constitute alteration of the status quo.' 50
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Douglas County v. Babbit con-
flicts with the Kootenai court's rationale. 15 1 In Babbit, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that NEPA procedures do not apply to agency actions
that do not alter the physical environment.1 52 The Babbit court re-
lied on Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of NEPA's
requirements. 153 The Ninth Circuit also found that conservation of
146. See Lindstrom, supra note 65 at 246 (stating EIS is tool that agencies must
utilize in order to ensure they are in compliance with national environmental
policy).
147. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994),
which establishes situations in which EIS is required by federal agency action).
148. See id. at 123941 (addressing and holding that Rule in fact required
EIS).
149. See id. at 1241 (recognizing that NEPA does not require EIS under all
circumstances, while also admitting that EIS compliance may apply to all agency's
non-affirmative actions).
150. See id. at 1241 (dismissing Forest Service's arguments that areas affected
under Rule undergo no affirmative action and thus preclude NEPA EIS require-
ments). Instead the court found that preventing land management techniques
qualifies as a demonstrable impact on the environment thus falling under NEPA
guidelines. See id.
151. Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
NEPA does not apply in situations that designate critical habitat).
152. See id. at 1505 (noting Secretary of Interior's act to designate natural
habitat for endangered species was challenged on grounds of noncompliance with
the NEPA standards). The court held that NEPA guidelines do not apply to criti-
cal habitat designation or action that intends to preserve existing physical environ-
ment. See id.
153. See id. (discussing Supreme Court decision in Metro, 460 U.S. 766, 772-73
(1983), in which Court reasoned that NEPA's goals evidenced through congres-
sional intent, illustrate desire to protect environment). The Supreme Court as-
serted that NEPA does not require impact discussion on every federal action; and
in seeking protection of social health and welfare; Congress chose to use NEPA as
a means to an identified end. See id. The Court stated that the purpose of an EIS
is to identify possible adverse environmental impacts in federal action that alter
the land, sea, or air. See id. However, the Metro Court rationalized that leaving the
physical environment alone and designating it as a protected area does not alter
the environment in a manner consistent with actions requiring EIS compliance. See
20
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the environment is not a federal action that would be guided under
NEPA.154
The Ninth Circuit's rationalization for its holding rested on
the belief that preservation of the existing environment helped to
prevent human interference. 155 Consequently, this natural progres-
sion protects the environment and adheres to NEPA's goal of re-
quiing an EIS. 156 The Ninth Circuit quoted case law suggesting
that requiring an EIS for agency action that furthers the purpose of
NEPA could actually hinder the attainment of those environmental
protection goals. 1 57
The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court decision
in Metro.1 5s The Metro Court helped establish actions necessary
under NEPA to trigger an EIS.' 59 In evaluating environmental im-
pacts and adverse effects from agency action, the Court determined
that not every impact or effect mandates assessment.160 The Metro
Court held that such assessment is only required in situations that
effect the environment itself.' 6' In defining the context in which
NEPA requirements apply to the environment, the Metro Court con-
cluded that they only pertain to the physical environment. 62 Fur-
ther, the Court rationalized that this contextual limitation allowed
for human welfare to be promoted by educating agencies of the
effects on the physical environment that their plans may incur. 16 3
154. See id. at 1505-06 (concluding such rationale of not requiring EIS is
shared by other courts, such as in Fifth and Eighth Circuits).
155. See id. at 1506 (stating environment will shift, change, and evolve in natu-
ral process when human interference is prohibited and this is cognizant of goals
prompted by NEPA).
156. For a further discussion of the Rule's compliance with NEPA goals, see
supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
157. See Babbit, 48 F.3d at 1506 (quoting Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d
829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981)).
158. See Metro, 460 U.S. 766, 771-73 (1983) (holding Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission was not required under NEPA to consider psychological issues regarding
nuclear accident).
159. See id. (using legislative intent, statutory sponsor quotation, as well as
court interpretation to formulate some working guidelines for NEPA requirements
and procedures; specifically, in what situations NEPA requirements are sparked).
160. See id. at 772 (paraphrasing wording from statutory language of NEPA
Section 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1994) and discussing importance of term "en-
vironmental" in determining NEPA requirements).
161. See id. (interpreting environment in contextual manner and limiting it to
physical environment).
162. See id. at 772-73 (recognizing NEPA's goals are ends in which Congress
intended to accomplish means of protecting physical environment).
163. See Metro, 460 U.S. at 772-73 (discussing statutory language of EIS re-
quirement intending to take "hard look" at agency action that may significantly
affect human environment).
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Despite the 'Metro Court's clear limitation on NEPA's application,
the district court in Kootenai utilized the Supreme Court's decision
to create a bridge between preventing land management tech-
niques and a change in the physical environment.' 64
In light of the district court's rationale in Kootenai, it becomes
important to question the court's compliance with the judicial dicta
of their own circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and that of the Supreme
Court.' 6 5 The district court did not provide reasoning for depart-
ing from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit decisions; rather
it rejected the Forest Service's reliance on case law purporting to
negate EIS compliance, in one isolated comment. 66 The district
court even cited Metro, by concluding that preventing land manage-
ment techniques would equate to a demonstrable impact on the
environment. 67 However, the district court's reasoning is inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent. 6 8 The district court creates a
demonstrable impact through the Rule's plan of leaving forestland
as is, thereby preventing or limiting acts such as road construction
or timber harvesting'1W The district court fails to clarify how the
Rule distinguishes itself from the type of federal action discussed by
the Supreme Court that preserves existing lands, thus allowing nat-
ural environmental processes to dictate impact.171
B. Ripeness
A critical turning point in the district court's analysis came dur-
ing its discussion of ripeness. 71 The ripeness doctrine exists "to
keep the judiciary from entangling itself in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies by preventing premature adjudica-
164. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Venenan, 142 F. Stipp. 2d 1231, 1241 (D.
Idaho 2001) (citing Supreme Court decision as support for connection of "leaving
nature alone" and demonstrable impact on physical environment).
165. For a further discussion of applicable caselaw conflicting with Kootenai
decision, see supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
166. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (distinguishing cases from present
case on basis that Rule will add to, modify, and remove decisions from other forest
management plans).
167. See id. at 1241 (citing Metro, 460 U.S. at 722, where Supreme Court reiter-
ated need for NEPA in situations where there would be demonstrable impact on
physical environment around us).
168. See id.
169. See id. (stating that Rule's prohibitions have demonstrable impact on
world around us and this is what Congress intended NEPA to remedy).
170. See id. The court does not distinguish Metro, 460 U.S. at 722, from its
own findings; but rather it cites the case as support without articulating the specific
connection. See id.
171. See id. (raising sua sponte issue of ripeness finding that claim is ripe for
review in this case).
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tion.' 172 When determining ripeness, a court must evaluate its fit-
ness for judicial review and the hardship of a delayed court decision
on the parties involved. 17- The district court recognized that ripe-
ness is a procedural question determinative of jurisdiction. 174 In
order to be ripe under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), a
regulation's factual component of a concrete action linking the reg-
ulation to the claimed injury must be worked out.175 A court can-
not determine the legitimacy of a regulation unless it first
determines the regulation's impact. 76 A final decision needs to be
made regarding the regulation's application. 77 The district court
in Kootenai supported a finding of ripeness through the publication
of the Rule in the Federal Register and Record of Decision.' 78 The
court recognized the government's withdrawal of their position re-
garding the matter as well as the pending status report, yet found
ripeness due to failure to remedy.' 79
Other courts have interpreted ripeness in a manner that blocks
judicial review of actions similar to the one at issue in Kootenai.180
Courts are reluctant to become involved and make decisions con-
cerning actions that agencies may modify or even abandon.' 8 ' Fur-
ther, where judicial review places the court in a position to be a
172. Cohen, supra note 88 at 550 (quoting Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606,
614 (7th Cir. 1995)). Cohen also points out that the plaintiff does not need to put
off litigation of specific project when claimed injury fits within overall plan. Id.
173. See id. (stating that to make this determination it has been found that
three questions are necessary: (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to
the plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial intervention would interfere inappropriately
with administrative action; and (3) whether there is any benefit from courts factu-
ally developing presented issues).
174. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (distinguishing ripeness as jurisdic-
tional question). If claim is not ripe, then the court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claim and it should dismiss the action. Id.
175. See id. (discussing "fleshing out" of action applicable to plaintiffs'
claimed harm).
176. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1998)
(quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986),
which purports necessity of "final decision" regarding regulation).
177. See id.
178. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1242. The Kootenai court stated that no
dispute regarding publication arose, and therefore, notwithstanding President
Bush's postponement the Rule would already be in effect. Id. The court contin-
ued that not finding the matter to be ripe would not provide a remedy for the
plaintiffs in this case. See id. Therefore, the court found the matter ripe despite
the government's contention of review of the Rule. See id.
179. See id. (holding that waiting until release of Government's status report,
in regards to ripeness, is not adequate remedy).
180. See Gregory, supra note 9, at 614 (discussing how courts have utilized
ripeness doctrine to block judicial review of forest plans).
181. See id. at 615 (supporting policy decisions have led to court's desire to
stay away from agency review).
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generalist in deciding matters, an agency is considered the best en-
tity to make decisions about its own regulations.8 2 As such, courts
hold that where an agency action can raise new facts or where
'more minds' may change a plan's outlook, a court should defer to
the agency.' 83
In Kootenai, the court postponed the Rule awaiting further gov-
ernment inquiry.'8 4 This left the Rule open to "more minds" and
possible changes in order to move the Rule from the final stage and
back into the planning, pre-implementation stage.'8 5 The district
court recognized that finding an injury was premature in this case
because the Rule had not produced any irreparable affects on the
Plaintiffs.' 8 6 With irreparable injury findings premature, the court
arguably states that further governmental action is necessary to
make a finding.'8 7 As such, it would appear that not all compo-
nents of the Rule were sufficiently explored to warrant a judicial
decision. Therefore, the district court contradicts its own findings.
While the matter is ripe on its face, it was not sufficiently ripe to
find injury. 8 8 The holding is inconsistent both internally and ex-
ternally, with hesitation from other courts to find agency actions
ripe for fear of unnecessary judicial review.1 19
VI. IMPACT
The impact of Kootenai weakens the fundamental goals of the
Rule and possible future environmental conservation efforts. 190
The government could allot time under the new administration to
review and possibly alter the Rule. Unfortunately, the decision
182. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Alcock, 867 F. Supp. 1026, 1043 (N.D.Ga.
1994) (discussing "generalist federal court" idea that some matters are too complex
for judicial review and can be decided and meshed out better at agency level).
183. See id. (recognizing new agency cycles and possible new facts allow
agency to be more appropriate body for review).
184. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 (discussing postponement of Rule
until further government inquiry was completed in May 2001).
185. See id. (postponing Rule could lead to possible revisions, changing what
is finally implemented).
186. See id. at 1247-48 (finding irreparable injury premature until governmen-
tal status report).
187. See id. (finding further government action necessary only insofar as status
report expected by May 4, 2001).
188. For a further discussion of the district court's finding of ripeness in Koote-
nai, see supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
189. For a further discussion of the district court's finding of ripeness in Koote-
nai, see supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
190. See Kootenai 1, 2001 WL 1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001)(finding
injunctive relief against implementation of all aspects of Rule).
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granting an injunction could bar the Rule and negate the govern-
ment's efforts or the implementation of the Rule altogether. 191
Finding an EIS requirement for the Rule under NEPA may
place an unnecessary burden on the Forest Service. 192 The Rule
was intended to be an environmental protection measure to ensure
the survival of roadless areas throughout much of the Western
United States.1 93 The Rule arguably fits within the specific scope of
NEPA's goals, thus exempting it from the EIS requirement. 194 De-
spite burdening the agency and hindering the development of the
Rule, such a requirement may have inappropriately placed the mat-
ter within judicial review.1 95 Not only does this implicate a possible
abuse of judicial review, but also demonstrates that the Kootenai
court clearly abandoned Supreme Court precedent. 196 Despite any
effects of Kootenai on the ability of the Forest Service to produce a
land conservation measure like the Rule, the impact on future
court findings and applications of NEPA requirements may be mis-
applied. 19 7 This could inappropriately place many environmental
conservation measures within judicial review, halting or forever hin-
dering such movements.
Holding the matter ripe for review while admitting a finding of
irreparable injury is premature suggests the finding of injunctive
relief may also be premature. 198 A matter cannot be ripe yet also be
191. See id. For a further discussion of the timing of the Rule and granting of
an injuction, see supra notes 171-72.
192. SeeJohnson, supra note 72, at 577 (discussing NEPA's EIS requirements
and what preparing an EIS entails). An EIS requires public comment, presenta-
tion of materials and research, conducting research of environmental impacts and
the like. See id. This process could pose financial as well as time constraints on an
agency; therefore, finding an EIS to be necessary for an action is important in
distribution of these costs on an agency. See id.
193. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1235 (presenting historical background
of Rule through President Clinton's directive in 1999).
194. See id. at 123940 (discussing Intervenor's argument that Rule is not sub-
ject to NEPA's guidelines and requirements).
195. For a further discussion of judicial review of the EIS requirement, see
supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
196. See Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that NEPA guidelines do not apply to critical habitat designation or action that
intends to preserve existing physical environment); see also Metro, 460 U.S. 766,
772-72 (1983) (reasoning that NEPA's goals are evidenced through congressional
intent and desire to protect environment). The Metro Court reasoned that leaving
the physical environment alone and designating it as a protected area does not
alter the environment in a manner consistent with actions requiring EIS compli-
ance. See Metro, 460 U.S. at 772.
197. For a further discussion of the district court's findings, see supra notes
94-139 and accompanying text.
198. See Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. The court found at the closing of
its opinion that a decision on injunctive relief was premature because of the pend-
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premature due to pending governmental review. This leaves the
district court tangled in its own wording. The court may have been
apprehensive in finding the matter unripe for fear of barring future
action; yet the court maintains its assertion later in the opinion that
timing is inappropriate to find for an injunction against the
Rule. 199 This leaves the district court vulnerable to consistency ar-
guments on appeal, and an appellate court may find that the matter
had not been ripe when the district court reviewed the claim.200
The EIS and ripeness requirements are two aspects of the Koo-
tenai decision that are controversially outside the bounds of case
law, leaving many questions open for the pending appeal. 211 Pres-
ently, the Rule, at least in Idaho, has been enjoined. 2 12 Future pro-
tection efforts for roadless areas are uncertain. Moreover, the
district court's decision has uncertain impacts upon NEPA require-
ments and the ripeness doctrine. Public support of striking the
Rule allows the court to bar environmental conservation efforts by
utilizing judicial dicta. Many suggest that the injunction is a posi-
tive step to increase land protection through cooperation among
local and state level governments. 203 Supporters of this viewpoint
cite NEPA as a guarantee to ensure, "the public's right to partici-
pate in governmental decision making."20 4 The decision has been
praised as a step towards site-specific determinations rather than
application of conservation efforts to large areas that could result in
ing Government status report. See id. However, the court rests this specific finding
on the fact that finding irreparable injury is premature in light of pending Govern-
ment action. See id. However, by finding possible injury earlier in the opinion,
why did the court utilize injury as a rationale for prematurity? Perhaps, because
having already found the matter ripe, the court realized the conundrum it would
be engaging in if it just stated that finding an injunction itself is premature - this
may have insinuated a lack of ripeness due to timing of the Government status
report. See id.
199. See id. (holding that finding irreparable injury is premature).
200. See 66 Fed. Reg. 44,111 (Aug. 22, 2001) (discussing pending nature of
Kootenai case before Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
201. For a further discussion of EIS and ripeness requirement in Kootenai,
see supra notes 140-83 and accompanying text.
202. See Kootenai 1, 2001 WL 1141275, at *2 (D. Idaho May 10, 2001) (granting
injunction against all aspects of Rule).
203. See Gibbons Praises Bush Administration for Balanced Approach at Roadless
Rule, available at http://www.house.gov/gibbons/roadlessrule.htm (last visited
Oct. 6, 2002) (praising Bush Administration for approaching Roadless Rule in bal-
anced manner encompassing state and local governments in environmental con-
servation decision-making).
204. See Press Release, Alan G. Lance, Attorney General of State of Idaho,
"Idaho Wins Injunction Blocking Roadless Rule," available at www2.state.id.us/ag/
newsrel/2001/pr-may102001.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002) (noting that blocking
Clinton's Roadless Rule is victory for public's right to participate in government
decision-making).
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large-scale devastating impacts. 20 5 As Kootenai suggests, how courts
deal with NEPA requirements and ripeness remains open to inter-
pretation. The decision may ironically leave a trail or "a road" for
how future courts deal with similar issues as well as future efforts to
protect roadless areas.
Kristine Meindl
205. See Gibbons Praises Bush Administration for Balanced Approach at Roadless
Rule, supra note 198 (suggesting Rule restricts solving of nation-wide energy crisis
and citizen enjoyment of public lands).
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